Name: draft-white-pathconsiderations-03
Title: Considerations in Validating the Path in Routing Protocols
State: Active
Authors: Russ White, Bora Akyol, Nick Feamster
Group: Individual Submissions (none)
Date: 2004-10-05
A good deal of consideration has gone into, and is currently being given
to, validating the path to a destination advertised by an adjacent router
or peer, such as [S-BGP], [SOBGP-DEPLOY], and [IRV]. Since much of this
effort has been focused on BGP, this draft discusses some issues with this
work in terms of BGP. One of the primary assumptions in much of this work
is that the authentication of a given advertisement received by a specific
BGP speaker is the same as authorization to use the path advertised. In
other words, it is generally assumed that if a BGP speaker receives an
advertisement for which the AS Path can somehow be verified, the speaker is
authorized to transit traffic along the path specified contained in the
update, and the traffic forwarded to the destination contained in the
update will actually follow the path advertised. This draft shows these two
assumptions cannot be held to be true in a path vector routing system.
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